



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF CARL FRIEDRICH GOESCHEL BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

CHAPTER II.¹*Personality, or the Immanent Development of the Soul and its Immortality.*

As the crowning result of the labor of all previous periods, philosophy has at last discovered its true method, and therein attained the one form adequate to its content. It is true that the critical philosophy arraigned the dogmatic procedure, and exposed its inadequacy, yet this same critical philosophy fell into the dogmatism it denounced, and the dogmatic method of demonstration (in part under the altered name of construction) prevailed until philosophy attained insight into the genetic development of the idea. Even now the speculative method is grossly misunderstood; it is still to many an insoluble enigma that the content should be developed from the concept—"from the concept" meaning to them just as much *as*, and not one whit more *than*, the old *a priori*. In the worst case of all, however, are those who, understanding the open secret quite as little as others, yet insist upon their own comprehension. The philosophy which has not only recognized the inadequacy of a method based upon the dualism between Being and Thought, but has also substituted for it the progressive development of the concept or notion growing out of and moving towards the identity of subject and object, is, by such as these, harangued and tutored, and condescendingly urged to consider the wonderful fact that a formal or subjective logic is not adequate to objective reality and true conviction, and that this subjective logic must, therefore, be supplemented by objective experience. Thereupon this experience is interpolated extempore instead of being included as method in the identity of Being and Thought, and developed and mediated in the development of the concept or notion. The object is not something

¹ [The introduction and first chapter of this work were translated by Mr. T. R. Vickroy, and published in volume xi (pages 65, 177, 372) of this journal.—Ed.]

different from its concept or notion, but one with it; hence, the object develops in and through itself, and through this development comes to its experience. Methodically pursuing and following the object, we experience it in ourselves. How this may be more definitely understood—how the self-developing, progressive movement from the concept identical with its object, or from the object identical with its concept, which the subject looks upon and follows, reveals itself as the most vital experience—we shall learn in the progress of the task which we have set ourselves, and we shall also see clearly how this movement differs in the sharpest manner from the dogmatic method of proof of which dualism is the root, and which (whether interposed *a priori* or *a posteriori*), being transcendental, is necessarily external.

Critical philosophy reproached dogmatism for presupposing without proof the agreement of thought and its object, and this reproach was deserved. It then sought to show that this agreement could not be proved; the attempt was, however, an utter failure, and the proposition that the unity of Thought and Being could not be demonstrated proved to be itself undemonstrable. It is most remarkable that this critical philosophy, while challenging and censuring the presupposition of the as yet unproved identity of Being and Thought, itself presupposes, without demonstrating, the duality of subject and object. With the recognition of this defect, progressive philosophy learns to presuppose nothing, neither to assume anything nor to accept anything as already settled, but to investigate and discover how everything given immediately develops and mediates itself. In this manner we see Being develop itself logically out of Nothing, through Becoming, to the Notion or Comprehension and the Absolute Idea, and then conversely find these several steps, moments, or categories outside of and beside each other in whatever is immediately given. This done, we are at home everywhere in general, for we have learned to complete the circle from any given point of its circumference. It may be objected that, in the Logic, Thought immediately presupposes and postulates itself; we answer that thought is immediate only in so far as it is its own mediation. Therefore, it is the beginning which realizes and confirms itself in its development, and in itself it both finds and surmounts being. That thought is its own mediation is no ground for rec-

ognizing something different from thought as prior to thought, but, on the contrary, this self-mediation forces us to recognize thought as the true beginning from which Being develops itself into Comprehension—herewith proving, also, that being pertains to Comprehension.

This general course of development once mastered, any special experience in any sphere of the real world will reveal itself as a necessary internal development of the thought of the given object, and with ever new astonishment we shall be confirmed in the recognition that in whatever is immediate may be found, though in manifold and varied forms, the same moments or categories which revealed themselves on the plane of pure thought.

The given object in our present investigation is the human soul. It is given as Thought, and can, therefore, still less than other given objects, withdraw itself from the categories of Thought. We shall, however, not make even this presupposition, but shall simply observe how the soul develops in itself. We shall take the soul as it is—abstracting nothing from it—imputing to it no foreign or external element. The command laid upon Philosophy, says a great master, is like the Saviour's command to the rich youth, who, hearing it, went away sorrowful. Pure philosophy thrives only under poverty and restraint; like the nun, it is bound by the three monastic vows.

If, then, the soul develops according to its own essential nature, and, in obedience to its own laws, moves forward to its immortality, it cannot be reproached with having borrowed help from something external whose accord with its nature must be demonstrated. The critical consideration whether the categories, as subjective forms, can be held valid in the object has certainly no validity in the psychological sphere, because here the subject is unquestionably its own object. The more rigorously, therefore, in this sphere must the demand be insisted upon that there shall be no transition as in a demonstration from *one* to the *other* in order to bind together in thought things which exist as separate; but that, on the contrary, the one shall produce in and out of itself its own determinations.

The question whether the soul persists presupposes the progressive development of the soul. For, if the soul does not progress neither can it perish; it remains *as* it is and *what* it is: having

permanence, can it lack continuance? If, on the contrary, the soul progresses, it does not remain *as* it is, and, therefore, it behooves us to see if it remains *what* it is—that is to say, whether, under changes in its modes of manifestation, its essence remains unchanged.

Evidently all turns upon the mediatorial question of *how* the soul develops or progresses. In the answer to this, the immediate questions of whether or not the soul progresses, and whether or not it persists, are also answered. Just on this account we must postpone these immediate questions which insist on fixing, in advance, the end of an untravelled road, and confine ourselves to the concrete question of how the soul develops and unfolds. We shall follow the soul in its own path; thus following, we shall learn whither the path tends.

Herewith we are directed into the path of experience. As we know the soul first under the form of its immediate existence, so we can follow its progressive development and note the various phases of its manifestation. There is no ground for presupposing a difference between Being and its experience; rather the experience develops itself out of Being as Being develops itself out of thought. We might, however, move from Thought as our starting-point, in order therein to recognize the same categories. No matter how we begin, whether we move from the accidental and immediate—*i. e.*, from a given object—or whether we start with the Universal—*i. e.*, with Thought—everywhere, in the most distinct and varied spheres, we shall find the same progressive movement. The universal particularizes itself in differences which then again mediate themselves in unity. The comprehension or concept dirempts itself in itself into subject and object in order to annul this separation in their identification. The subjective concept divides itself in judgments that it may reunite with itself in the syllogism. The first phase is the immediate unity and totality; the second, the self-diremption of this totality into being and essence, outward and inward; the third is the transfiguration of the difference into unity. Thus man, too, is first a single and undivided essence; but he dirempts himself into outward and inward, body and soul, and this diremption occurs not only in thought through reflection, but also in fact through death. The final phase would be the transfigured unity of soul and body; this is the res-

urrection in the Spirit. Upon this insight rests the trichotomy of the New Testament, which ascribes to man body, soul, and spirit, and to the Godhead ascribes three persons.

In our present inquiry, however, the starting-point is not *man*; he has served us only as the example of a universal law of development. Not man in his totality is our starting-point, but a part of man, itself first abstracted through reflection—namely, the soul of man—but the entire soul. Neither is resurrection our goal, for we must seek our goal, not assume it. Nevertheless, as resurrection is the ultimate truth and goal of the soul, it is obvious that from the beginning of our inquiry some kind of persistency conformable to the essence of the soul must be presupposed. It is obvious, also, that in the idea of resurrection there is implied, as a necessary condition, the perpetuity of the body in a manner corresponding to its conception or notion, which is that of externality or otherness. Thus much, therefore, may be presupposed; namely, that the immortality of the human soul has for its starting-point the soul itself, while the resurrection of the body, as well as its reunion with the soul, has for its starting-point the total man.

The human soul, then, is our initial point. Let us ask, first, whether in the soul, considered as a totality, may be discerned progress through the ever-recurring moments of unity, self-separation, and self-identification. As a totality, the soul, in its immediacy, is homogeneous and undivided, but just from this it follows that the soul sunders, distinguishes, separates itself from itself, in order to realize its unity. As *Thought*, the soul, in its immediacy, is blank, potential thought—thought without distinction and without reflection. In the second stage or moment, thought distinguishes itself from being; thought and being are opposed to each other until thought becomes conscious of being. As *Being*, the soul, in its immediacy, is Thought sunk in the Material, and the Material is Being in which thought lies concealed and undeveloped. In this immediacy, the soul has unity only because it is unconscious and undeveloped, and, in this indifference and unconsciousness, it contradicts its own essential nature. In the second phase, this unconscious *being* of the soul having, as individual, completed the spheres of being, develops itself into consciousness in that Being: since as individual it reflects itself after its self-separation both in

itself and in its other it falls into self-difference ; Consciousness is this difference itself, for self-consciousness necessarily implies consciousness of all that through self-separation is made other than self. The third phase demands that this divided consciousness annul its tension, therein realizing a mediated unity ; in so far as it recognizes itself not only in itself, but in its other, it attains unity with its other, and therein realizes itself as Spirit.

The progressive movement of the soul can, accordingly, be indicated in three words—Soul, Consciousness, and Spirit or Individual—Subject and Identity of the Subject with the Object. But the question arises, What have we thereby gained ? Can we abstract the meaning of our formulated statement ? Are we able to show how the content of these several moments is self-unfolding and self-revealing ?

Primarily, it may be mentioned that in this division the Aristotelian doctrine of three souls seems to be realized in its underlying truth. The first is the nutritive Soul (*ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ*), found in and identical with the life of the plant. The second is the life of the animal or the sensitive Soul (*ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ*) ; this sensitive Soul in human life comes to consciousness through reflecting itself in itself, and thus finding the internal in itself. The third is the rational Soul (*ἡ νοητικὴ ψυχὴ*), which rises out of human consciousness, and, identifying itself with its object realizes itself as Spirit. (Aristot., "De Anima," ii, 2, 3, 4 ; iii, 12, 13.)

As man develops himself in body, soul, and spirit, so the soul, abstracted from its sensible, tangible body, passes through phases of development corresponding to body, soul, and spirit. That is to say, the soul in its first phase is an immediate totality ; in its second phase it estranges itself from itself, making itself its own object ; in its third phase it penetrates to the identity of subject and object. Thus the soul is first its own body or its own foundation ; it serves itself without distinguishing itself from the body. With the act of distinguishing comes also synthesis ; this is the *soul* which, distinguishing and uniting, holds sway over body and spirit. The third is the actually mediated unity, which, rising above body and soul, includes and transfigures both.

To this trichotomy is related that into which Plato analyzed both the individual Soul and the State. First is the body—that which obeys and serves—the basis of all further development, τὸ

ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἢ χρηματιστικὸν; the second, or the mean *between* the first and last, is the *Soul*, or that which simultaneously sunders and reunites, called τὸ θυμικὸν ἢ θυμο-ειδὲς and ἐπικουρικὸν; the third is the spirit, or the mean *above* the first and second, the unity of both, or Reason, τὸ λογιστικὸν, ὁ Νοῦς. In so far as the soul is thought as abstracted from its external body, its body subsists through its (soul's) individuality; its soul is its self-consciousness, with which are necessarily bound up the consciousness of its object and its own distinction, therefore; the third is Reason, or the Spirit which takes up into itself and mediates both the preceding phases of development. The first is Hypothesis, the second Antithesis and Synthesis, the third Thesis: or, 1, Soul; 2, Consciousness as distinguishing and uniting; 3, Spirit or Reason.

The development of the soul into consciousness, and of consciousness into spirit, is experimentally confirmed: it is in general represented as an awakening. Even the rudest empirical theories of the soul teach something of this awakening; but the truth of this phenomenon, the content of this observation, is not brought to light. To us, however, this progress of the soul, through its own self-diremption into inner and outer and conscious mediation, has revealed and vindicated itself as the universal dialectic of immediacy.

That the soul in its progressive movement develops from itself, receiving into itself nothing foreign and external, is proved in the end by the fact that the soul, in its highest perfection as spirit, has no other content than before. The nature of the soul, after as before its development, consists in the identity of thought and the object of thought. The perfection of the soul is simply the mediation of this unity and its elevation into consciousness. The child longs for and tries to grasp the moon, because he feels it as his object, and dependent on himself; this is the soul's immediate unity with its other. The youth recognizes the difference from and the elevation above himself of what seemed before one with him and subject to him; finally, the man comprehends that the star which the child tried to seize with his hands is but a single moment in the totality of spirit.

Through this same organic process of estrangement, and its removal, the immediate unity of love comes to its rational mediation or idea. The realized idea of love is marriage. Parallels

and symbols of marriage are found throughout the spheres of spirit. Unity is followed by separation, separation by reunion, betrothal, marriage. We discern these organic moments in the tender and significant myth which closes the old world and opens the new; this myth belongs essentially to the history of the doctrine of immortality. In it we see how Psyche, the king's daughter, outgrows her origin and breaks loose from it; how, like Iphigenia, she is exposed by her own parents; how she is rescued and borne away by Zephyr, and transplanted immediately into immediate relation or spontaneous union with the all-unifying Spirit of love. She rests in love, in inmost oneness with the unseen and invisible God. But there comes a moment of temptation—temptation which she does not resist. She is enticed by the longing to know. She steps out of innocence and unconsciousness not only into knowledge, but into alienation. She feels the misery and degradation of estrangement; she knows the bitterness of slavery, and in the sweat of her face performs her cruel tasks. But she has also the hope of deliverance; she struggles to cancel difference and annul separation, thus reuniting herself with the alienated Spirit of love. He, in the distance, is still near her; in the supreme moments of trial, he sustains her. At last she is conscious of reconciliation and deliverance; the bridegroom comes; love realizes itself in marriage; the marriage is ratified in heaven, and the bride receives immortality, for immortality consists in this marriage of the mortal and the divine.

In this ancient myth, the development of the soul through its successive grades is embodied and illustrated: but the content of the soul is not disclosed; the determinations remain abstract; the result unmediated. For logical development, we have compounded with a poetic myth; immortality does not seem to develop itself, but to be bestowed from without. We have followed the course of development *in time*, and seen it attain its crowning result. The soul is at the goal of the race; and this may involve the destruction of the soul. As the soul has risen out of immediate unconscious unity, shall it not complete the circle of its life by return into the same? Is this final rest the reconciliation which follows the long and weary struggle?

So it appears: the soul's movement, which we have traced empirically, does not necessitate the immortality of the soul.

Completing itself in time, it needs no eternal continuance. This appearance will, however, at once negate itself, for it is based upon the outward course of development, and has taken no cognizance of the content of this development. The next step, therefore, is to consider the various stages of the soul's movement with reference to their content, and its unfolding, in order to determine if anything further follows from it.

To exhibit the nature of the soul involves, according to Plato, a long and divine investigation. This investigation is, however, nothing external, but consists in the immanent self-development of the soul into Spirit, which is the realized idea of the soul. The investigation is a *long* one, because it implies this internal realization; and, if the soul is immortal, its immortality consists in its development into spirit, in its exhibition of the idea of the soul through making explicit all that this idea implies. This development can only be called "*divine*" in so far as the Godhead is its beginning and its end. To experience its length, we must travel again, with slow and carefully considered steps, the road over which we have already rapidly passed. We often gain more by repeating a journey than in making it for the first time. With reference to our beginning, we must at first place it in the soul, for it belongs to the thought of immanent development that nothing shall be given from without; the initial question must, therefore, be what the soul can find in itself. The end of the course in which the soul moves we may name, in advance, the Spirit; but we must inquire, definitely what *is* the Spirit, and how, following the movement of the soul, we can find its beginning and its end in God.